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UNITED STATES v. LEE: AN INSENSITIVE
APPROACH TO THE FREE EXERCISE
OF RELIGION
I. INTRODUCTION
In speaking of the free exercise clause,' Justice Stewart noted that
"on occasion ... the Court has shown what has seemed to me a dis-
tressing insensitivity to the appropriate demands of this constitutional
guarantee."2 Arguably, one such occasion recently arose in United
States v. Lee3 In Lee, the Supreme Court refused to exempt Amish
employers from having to pay social security taxes. The Court de-
clared that compulsory participation by all employers in the welfare
system outweighed the free exercise rights of the Amish.4
The purpose of this Note is to provide an outline of past free exer-
cise cases and to examine the impact of Lee on the protection of free
exercise rights in the future. Lee narrows the scope of the free exercise
clause in four significant ways. First, a close examination of Lee dem-
onstrates that the standard of review used to sustain the government's
interest in the area of taxation is less exacting when compared to other
recent free exercise cases. Secondly, the Lee decision indicated that a
valid law, neutral on its face, will almost always pass constitutional
scrutiny. The Court announced that religious adherents who enter into
"commercial activity' 5 cannot impose their religious limitations on a
statutory scheme that binds everyone else in that activity. Before Lee,
the Court had struck down neutral laws that imposed an undue burden
on the free exercise of religion, forcing the state to grant a religious
exemption. Lee suggests that the Court is retreating from its recent
protective attitude in the free exercise area.
Third, the Court, in uncharacteristic fashion, implies that the pos-
sibility of administrative convenience will outweigh the guarantee of
free exercise of religion. On several previous occasions, the Court has
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ......
2. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413-14 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982).
4. Id at 1055-57.
5. Id. at 1057.
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specifically rejected such a position.6  Until Lee, only compelling gov-
ernmental interests could justify a free exercise encroachment.
Fourth, the Lee Court moved away from the narrow balancing test
provided in Wisconsin v. Yoder.7 Unlike Yoder, the Lee decision
looked at the religious side of the balance in very broad terms. In de-
ciding against the Amish, the Court reasoned that certain religious
groups must yield to the common good in order that an organized soci-
ety survive.' If such generalizations are used by the Court to decide
future free exercise cases, an inherent bias will work against the protec-
tion of religion. The state's interests will always prevail if organized
society hangs in the balance. This approach is unrealistic and insensi-
tive to the needs of the free exercise clause. This Note suggests a more
practical approach to be used in deciding such cases, an approach that
focuses on the specific costs and benefits of accommodating religious
claims.
II. THE FREE EXERCISE FRAMEWORK
A. The Belief-Action Distinction
The purview of the free exercise clause was initially delineated in
the historic decision of Reynolds v. United States.9 Petitioner Reynolds,
a Mormon, fulfilled his religious duty by knowingly marrying two wo-
men at the same time. Reynolds was convicted for bigamy under fed-
eral law prohibiting such conduct in the territory of Utah.' 0 Appealing
6. See infra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
7. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Professor Marcus described the balancing process in lucid language.
In balancing interests under the free exercise clause. . . the individual has to make
a threshold showing that the case does involve an infringement of his religious rights; at
that point the state is called upon to convince the court that its regulation is a rational
one. Once both showings have been made, the court proceeds to balance the interest of
the state in promulgating the regulation against the individual's interest in taking the
restricted action and to determine which interest prevails.
Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973
DUKE LJ. 1217, 1240 (footnote omitted). Today the state must show "compelling" reasons why a
law that infringes on free exercise rights should be sustained. See infra notes 44-56. See generally
C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 116-71 (1978) (thorough explanation of
the balancing process with nonfree exercise cases as illustrations); Clark, Guidelhnesfor the Free
Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 327-44 (1969); Comment, War Tax Refusal Under the Free
Exercise Clause, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 753, 758-62 (examination of Court's current balancing ap-
proach in general and as applied to war tax refusal cases).
8. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1056.
9. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
10. One commentator observed that Reynolds "originated as a test case aimed at the issue of
religious freedom; the defendant was the personal secretary of Brigham Young, leader of the
Mormon church." Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder andBeyond"Alternativesfor the Free Exercise Clause,
1981 UTAH L. REv. 309, 318 n.35.
[Vol. 18:305
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his conviction, Reynolds took issue with certain jury instructions and
argued that the federal law prohibited the free exercise of his religion.1 '
After a brief review of the legislative intent surrounding the free
exercise clause, the Court concluded that Congress could legislate
against religiously motivated acts, but religious beliefs and opinions
were outside the legislative sphere. 12 According to the Court, the big-
amy law was not directed at religious beliefs, but rather at prohibiting
the violation of important social duties. Fearful of introducing "a new
element into criminal law" and making the "professed doctrines of reli-
gious belief superior to the law of the land,"' 3 the Court refused to
exempt Reynolds from the statute. The Court's initial belief-action dis-
tinction thus significantly narrowed the scope of the free exercise
clause.
B. The Ad Hoc Approach: Cantwell, Prince, and Braunfeld
Cantwell v. Connecticut 4 dealt with the Jehovah's Witnesses' vio-
lation of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the solicitation of money by
religious groups without proper authorization. The statute empowered
the secretary of the public welfare council to deny permits after a deter-
ruination that a valid religious cause was not being represented.' 5
Cantwel was convicted for soliciting contributions for certain religious
books without a permit. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Cantwell
urged that the law violated the free exercise of religion as protected by
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.' 6
11. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162. Appellant Reynolds had asked for the instruction that he was
to be found not guilty if the jury found his multiple marriages to be "in pursuance of and in
conformity with what he believed. . . to be a religious duty." Id at 161-62. Instead, the court
gave the instruction that his religious beliefs did not excuse him. Id
12. Id at 164-65. The Reynolds Court turned to the writings of Thomas Jefferson to find the
true intent of the free exercise clause. The Court adopted, in whole, Jefferson's view that religious
freedom extended to beliefs only. Professor Pepper argues that the Court's reliance on Jefferson's
work as authority on the issue was misplaced, pointing out that James Madison, the primary
author of the religion clause, took a completely opposite view of the scope of the clause. Pepper,
supra note 10, at 319-22 & n.45. For a thorough examination of the legislative history surround-
ing the free exercise clause, see Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 3-9 (1978); Pepper, supra note
10, at 311-17.
13. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67; accord Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (com-
pulsory vaccination required regardless of beliefs).
14. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
15. Id at 301-02.
16. Cantwell was also convicted for breach of the peace for playing phonographic records
abusive of the Catholic Church. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding no clear and
present danger in Cantwell's communication. Id at 309-11.
19821
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Agreeing with Cantwell, the Supreme Court for the first time held
that the fourteenth amendment's concept of "liberty" incorporated the
first amendment's free exercise of religion provision. t7 The Court
stated that the free exercise clause embraced "[the] freedom to believe
and [the] freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be."' 8 The Court then stressed that "[i]n
every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attain-
ing a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom."' 9 Ac-
cordingly, a state could legislate against religious acts so long as the law
did not unduly infringe on the free exercise of religion. In that sense,
the Court qualified the distinction between religious beliefs and reli-
gious acts left open by the Reynolds ruling.
Curiously, the Supreme Court did not decide that Connecticut's
anti-solicitation law constituted an undue infringement. Instead, the
Court grounded its ruling on the freedom of speech issue, finding the
law's religion test to be tantamount to censorship.2" Thus, it was un-
clear whether the religion issue had any decisive effect. While Cantwell
signalled a slight retreat from the restrictive belief-action standard of
Reynolds, the extent of free exercise protection of religiously motivated
acts remained uncertain.2'
Four years after Cantwell, the Supreme Court considered another
free exercise question involving the Jehovah's Witnesses in Prince v.
Massachusetts.22 Prince, however, did little to resolve the ambiguities
17. Id at 303-04.
18. Id
19. Id at 304.
20. Id at 305. The Court stated that had Connecticut not qualified the granting of a license
on a religious test, such a general law would not have been "open to any constitutional objection."
Id
21. The Supreme Court in the Cantwell era never decided a "pure" free exercise claim. All
of the religion cases had free speech issues coupled with them. Thus, it is unclear what impact the
free exercise clause had on the Court's decision-making process. As of 1940, the religion clause
had yet to gain a prominent foothold among first amendment liberties. See Minersville School
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (two children of the Jehovah's Witness faith expelled from
school for failing to salute the flag; lower court's injunction against the school reversed, holding
that neutral laws must prevail); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (Jehovah's Witness con-
victed for canvassing without a permit, reversed on pure speech grounds); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938) (Jehovah's Witness convicted for canvassing without a permit, reversed on free
press grounds). Contra Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (municipal ordinance
struck down that imposed a flat licensing tax on religious adherents who made their livelihood
from distributing literature); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (license fee for the
solicitation of religious contributions struck down on first amendment grounds); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (only grave and immediate dangers may justify
a religious interference). See generally Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J.
1115, 1121-26 (1973); Pepper, supra note 10, at 326-30.
22. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
[Vol. 18:305
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left in the wake of Reynolds and Cantwell. Petitioner Prince, in viola-
tion of a state law, had encouraged a child under her guardianship to
distribute religious magazines on a street comer. The appeal raised
questions of free exercise and parental rights.2 3
Prince presented the Court with a difficult question of balancing
interests. The power of the state to regulate child labor lay on one side
of the scale; on the other side lay the rights of parental and religious
freedom.24 The balance tipped in favor of the state as the Court ruled
that "the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom
and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and that this [range
of power] includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious
conviction."25
The issue of how far the state's power extended into the free exer-
cise area was left open. In dissent, Justice Murphy implored the Court
to adopt a clear and present danger standard of review.26 The majority
rejected such a measure and substituted a more deferential view:
"Massachusetts has determined that an absolute prohibition .. . is
necessary to accomplish its legitimate objectives.127 Thus, Prince af-
forded free exercise claims little protection since the Court, searching
long enough, could always find some legitimate state objective. Prince
demonstrated that the free exercise clause had not attained a priority
status among first amendment liberties. The impact of Prince was the
Court's failure to elucidate a clear standard of constitutional review to
decide free exercise cases.
The Court's ad hoc approach to answering free exercise questions
reached its zenith in 1961 with the ruling of Braunfeld v. Brown.28 In a
close decision, a plurality of Justices determined that a Pennsylvania
Sunday closing law did not violate the free exercise rights of Orthodox
23. Id at 159-64.
24. Justice Rutledge noted that "[t]o make accommodation between these freedoms and an
exercise of state authority always is delicate. . . . [T]he safest and most objective recourse is to
the lines already marked out. . . in narrowing the no man's land where this battle has gone on."
Id at 165.
25. Id at 167.
26. According to Justice Murphy, a law interfering with the practice of religion was justified
only upon showing "convincing proof that such a practice constitutes a grave and immediate
danger to the state or to the health, morals, or welfare of the child." Id at 174.
27. Id. at 170. The Massachusetts statute was directed toward enjoining the "crippling effects
of child employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other
activities subject to all the diverse influences of the street." Id at 174-75.
28. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). Professor Pfeffer succinctly remarked that "[t]he nadir of free exer-
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Jews.29 The law required Braunfeld to close his business on Sundays.
Braunfeld claimed that the criminal statute as applied violated his free-
dom of religion since he could not stay open on Saturday, the Orthodox
Jewish Sabbath. Braunfeld alleged that closing on both Saturday and
Sunday would force him out of business. In effect, Braunfeld argued,
the law gave non-Sabbatarian store owners an unfair economic
advantage.3°
Rejecting Braunfeld's contention, a plurality of the Court empha-
sized that "the statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious
practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activ-
ity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of
their religious beliefs more expensive."'" According to the plurality,
such an expense was justified unless a less restrictive law was available
to combat the alleged problem.32  The fact that the law put certain
religious groups at an economic disadvantage was not a decisive
point.33 Further, the decision in Braunfeld relied heavily on the fact
that only an indirect burden was imposed by the operation of the law.3a
Finding no infringement of constitutionally protected rights, the
plurality then inquired whether an exemption from the law should be
granted. The plurality found that the law was the least restrictive way
of assuring one peaceful day of rest in the week .3  Fearing administra-
tive problems, 36 the plurality rejected the possibility of an exception to
29. Braunfeld was one of several cases decided on the same day in which the Supreme Court
reviewed the constitutionality of various state Sunday closing statutes. See McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S, 582
(1961); Gallagher v. Crown-Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
Chief Justice Warren wrote the plurality opinion in Braunfeld in which Justices Black, Clark,
and Whittaker concurred. Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment. Justice Brennan concurred
in that Braunfeld presented no establishment clause problem, but disagreed with the Court con-
cerning the free exercise issue, Justice Stewart wrote a separate dissent, primarily following Bren-
nan's reasoning. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, filed a separate opinion in
McGowan that applied to Braunfeld as well as the Two Guys and Gallagher decisions. See Mc-
Gowan, 366 U.S. at 459. Justice Douglas wrote a dissent in McGowan that also applied to Brawn-
feld and the other two cases. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 561.
30. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 600-02.
31. Id at 605.
32. See id at 607. The Court effectively resurrected Reynolds by quoting extensively from
Jefferson's writings. See supra note 12.
33. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605-06.
34. The Court asserted that "[t]o strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation
which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion. . . would radically restrict the
operating latitude of the legislature." Id at 606.
35. Id at 608. The decisive opinion of Justice Frankfurter rested upon this proposition. Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449-50 (1961) (Frankfurter & Harlan, JJ., concurring).
36. The Court acknowledged three possible problems. First, an exemption would require the
policing of an additional day for possible violations. Second, an exemption would give Sabbatari-
[Vol. 18:305
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the law.
As in previous decisions, the Braunfeld opinion failed to provide a
clear standard of review. At times the Court indicated that a balancing
approach was being used to decide the case;37 at other times, the Court
used a deferential approach to sustain the state law.38  For the first
time, the Supreme Court reviewed a "pure" free exercise claim, one
that was not intermingled with any other first amendment issues. In
sum, the Court's ad hoc approach in Braunfeld failed to foster the pre-
dictability of outcomes in the free exercise area.
Justice Brennan, in dissent, acknowledged that the Court still lack-
ed an appropriate standard of review of free exercise claims. Brennan
believed that only a compelling governmental interest could outweigh
an individual's freedom of religion.39  According to Brennan, Penn-
sylvania's interest in providing the same day of rest for all did not war-
rant the "substantial, though indirect, limitation of appellants'
freedom."40 In short, Brennan viewed Pennsylvania's law as analogous
to an unconstitutional excise tax4' since it forced Braunfeld to choose
between obeying his religion, or losing his "capital investment. '42 Jus-
tice Stewart, agreeing with Brennan, noted that such a choice was cruel
and could not be demanded by the state.43
ans an economic advantage over those who were required to close on Sunday. Thus, people might
feign religious beliefs to stay open on Sunday. That possibility might force a potentially unconsti-
tutional inquiry by the state into the sincerity of one's religious beliefs. Finally, an exemption
would require employers to hire similar religiously exempted employees. Such a practice might
be contrary to the state's prohibition against religious discrimination in hiring. 366 U.S. at 608-09.
37. See id at 605 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)) (noting that the
balancing of the state's interest with religious beliefs was "a particularly delicate task").
38. The Court clearly stated that a religious exemption might be the wisest solution. "But
our concern is not with the wisdom of legislation but with its constitutional limitation." Braun-
feld, 366 U.S. at 608; Sf Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,-348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The day is
gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down
* . . [economic regulations]. . because they may be unwise .. "); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) ("[W]e [the Court] do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the
wisdom of legislation .... "); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (Court
will not use the fourteenth amendment to strike down unwise economic regulations). Thus,
Braunfeld is comparable to the very deferential view of the Court regarding economic-social legis-
lation and the due process clause.
39. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In requiring such a test, Justice
Brennan specifically rejected any possibility of a rational basis standard. The state might restrict
religious freedom to "prevent grave and immediate danger." Id at 612 (quoting West Virginia Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
40. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 614 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. Id at 613.
42. Id at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority opinion seemed unconcerned that the
cited indirect burden could constitute the financial collapse of Braunfeld.
43. Id at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a complete review of Supreme Court decisions
covering the free exercise clause from Reynolds to Braunfeld, see Pfeffer, supra note 21, at 1121-30.
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C. The Compelling Interest Standard: Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas
Although the Supreme Court in Braunfeld could not agree on the
appropriate standard of review to govern free exercise cases, the turn-
ing point 4 came two years later in Sherbert v. Verner.45 For the first
time, the Court declared that only compelling state interests could
subordinate a free exercise claim.46
Sherbert had been discharged from her job when she refused to
work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her Seventh Day Adventist
Church. South Carolina denied Sherbert unemployment compensation
on grounds that she had refused available work without "good
cause."'47 The South Carolina Supreme Court, in construing the appli-
cable statute, found that Sherbert's disqualification did not amount to
an infringement of her free exercise rights.48
Using a three step process, the Supreme Court reversed the South
Carolina ruling. The Court first inquired whether the denial of em-
ployment benefits operated to burden Sherbert's freedom of religion.
Finding such a burden, Justice Brennan wrote, "Here not only is it ap-
parent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely
from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego
that practice is unmistakable." 49 The Court then remarked that the
denial of benefits to Sherbert operated much like an unconstitutional
fine against Saturday worship.
Secondly, the Supreme Court found that no compelling state inter-
44. See Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L.
REv. 217.
Just over two years after it had decided the Sunday Closing Law Cases, the Supreme
Court spent what was perhaps its most eventful day on religion cases. In Abington
SchoolDist. v. Schempp, the Court held that school programs prescribing Bible reading
. . violated the establishment clause. In a less celebrated judgment on the same day,
Sherbert v. Verner, we find the dawn of the new day for religious freedom claims.
Id at 240-41 (citations omitted).
45. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Notably, Justice Brennan, who had vigorously dissented in Braun.
feld, was assigned to write the majority opinion. Accordingly, much of the Sherbert decision
draws its vitality from the earlier dissent in Braunfeld.
46. Id at 403 (quoting from NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
47. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-402. The Court noted that Sherbert had sought other employ-
ment in the area but was unable to find work on a five day a week basis. Sherbert's willingness to
accept work was also a crucial factor in the Court's favorable decision. Id at 399 n.2.
48. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion rested on the South Carolina Supreme Court's con-
struction ofthe statute. Harlan noted that the intent of the law was aimed at preventing involun-
tary unemployment. Id at 419. Sherbert had been denied benefits for her failure to work for
personal reasons. Her "unavailability" for work, religiously motivated or otherwise, justified the
rejection of benefits. Id at 420. While an exemption was possible, Justice Harlan did not believe
that it was constitutionally required. Id at 423 (Harlan & White, JJ., dissenting).
49. Id at 404.
[Vol. 18:305
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est justified the burden imposed by the law. In dicta, the Supreme
Court rejected the state's interest in preventing fraudulent claims on the
state's unemployment fund, "[I]t is highly doubtful whether such evi-
dence would be sufficient to warrant a substantial infringement of reli-
gious liberties."5 Even if the prevention of fraud were found to be a
compelling interest, the state still had the burden to prove that the law
was the least restrictive way of preventing such abuses.'
In the third step of the decision, the Supreme Court distinguished
Braunfeld from Sherbert to conclude that a religious exemption to the
statute was constitutionally required. In Braunfeld, unlike Sherbert, "a
strong state interest in providing a uniform day of rest" 2 justified
Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law. Conversely, the Court determined
that no such interest could be found in Sherbert to justify the law's
indirect burden on religion." Further, requiring a religious exemption
to the South Carolina law would not render "the entire statutory
scheme unworkable"54 as would have been the case in Braunfeld.55
With Sherbert, free exercise protection had come full circle. Be-
ginning with Reynolds, the Court gave religiously motivated acts no
protection from governmental interference. The decisions after Reyn-
olds allowed only reasonable burdens on religion, but the standard
used to measure those burdens was unclear. Sherbert held that reli-
gious acts must be given the highest level of constitutional protection
from state intervention. Accordingly, "[olly the gravest abuses, en-
dangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion."'56 That standard was contrary to the Court's initial ruling in
50. Id at 407. The issue of administrative inconvenience was not argued before the South
Carolina Supreme Court. Therefore, the Supreme Court was "unwilling to assess the importance
of an asserted state interest without the views of the state court." Id Regardless of that deferential
language, the Supreme Court, for all practical purposes, foreclosed the issue.
51. Id
52. Id at 408.
53. The Court distinguished the burden imposed on Braunfeld as less direct than that im-
posed on Sherbert. The facts clearly indicate otherwise, according to Justice Stewart; Braunfeld
faced the loss of his capital investment whereas Sherbert "would be denied a maximum of 22
weeks of compensation payments." Id at 417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring).
54. Id at 409.
55. In short, the Sherbert Court shaped the facts of Braunfeld to fit the compelling interest
test of the majority opinion. In Braunfeld, the Court concluded that uniform application of Penn-
sylvania's Sunday closing law presented no free exercise problems. In Sherbert, however, South
Carolina's attempt to uniformly apply unemployment disqualification provisions was rejected. It
is unclear how Pennsylvania's interest in eliminating the "atmosphere of commercial noise and
activity," Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608, is stronger than South Carolina's interest in preventing fraud
and the disruption of work schedules. Most observers find Braunfeld to be irreconcilable with
Sherbert. See Pepper, supra note 10, at 332 n.104; Pfeffer, supra note 21, at 1139.
56. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944)). The
1982]
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Reynolds.
The highly protective standard of Sherbert was reaffirmed by the
Court in 1972 with its landmark opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder.5 7
Yoder, a member of the Old Order Amish,58 was convicted under Wis-
consin's compulsory education statute for failing to send his daughter
to public school after the eighth grade. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
found Yoder's conviction to be invalid under the free exercise clause.
Using a careful balancing approach, the Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's ruling, holding that Wisconsin's interest in compulsory
education of Amish children past the eighth grade did not override the
freedom of religion interest.59
In Yoder, the Supreme Court initially presented a detailed look at
the Amish religion. 0 The Court went to great lengths to demonstrate
that compulsory education past the age of sixteen was contrary to
Amish beliefs. Uncontradicted expert testimony predicted that com-
pulsory education would "ultimately result in the destruction of the
Old Order Amish church community as it exists in the United States
today.""1 Further, the Court noted that the Amish alternative educa-
tional system of "learning through doing" may have been superior to
the state's educational system.62
With this background, the Court began its analysis of the constitu-
tional issues presented. Initially, Chief Justice Burger recognized the
Supreme Court later employed Sherbert to remand a Minnesota Supreme Court ruling convicting
a defendant for contempt for failure to serve jury duty for religious reasons. In re Jenison, 375
U.S. 14 (1963) (On remand, the Minnesota Court, following the guides of Sherbert, found no
compelling interest to force the defendant to serve. In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588
(1963)); see also People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (state ban
on the use of peyote in an Indian ceremony was unwarranted).
57. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
58. The Amish religion arose from the sixteenth-century Anabaptist movement, which
sought a return to early Christian life. The Old Order Amish sect emphasizes the separation of
church from the materialistic world. The Old Order Amish are devoted to living in harmony with
the land and are therefore primarily farmers. Id at 209-11.
59. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36.
60. Id at 209-13.
61. Id at 212. Professor Pepper points out that the Court's perspective on this burden may
have been slightly distorted.
A curious shift in perspective occurred with the Court's acceptance of the constitu-
tional relevance of this expert testimony. Surely there was no danger that the entire
religious faith and practice of these convictedparents would be totally destroyed if their
children attended two years of high school. . . .It is only over a span of generations
that two more years of high school can be perceived as such a total threat.
Pepper, supra note 10, at 338 (emphasis in original).
62. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 212. Chief Justice Burger also noted that the Amish had an "excellent
record as law-abiding. -. . members of society." Id at 212-13. Justice Douglas found this empha-
sis "quite irrelevant." Id at 246. (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
10
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highly important state interest in providing public education.63 Yet,
that interest was "not totally free from a balancing process" if it in-
fringed on free exercise rights.64 Much like the controversial statute in
Sherbert, the Wisconsin law could be saved by a showing that it did
not impose a religious burden or that a significant state interest justified
interference.65 The question then became which state interests could
outweigh free exercise liberties.
Following the lead of Sherbert, the Court answered,
The essence of all that has been said and written on the
subject is that only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims
to the free exercise of religion. We can accept it as settled,
therefore, that, however strong the State's interest in universal
compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclu-
sion or subordination of all other interests.66
Thus, Yoder definitely raised the free exercise clause to parity with
other fundamental rights that require substantial judicial protection
against governmental interference.67
Before balancing the interests involved, the Yoder Court examined
the "quality" 6 of the Amish claims. This section of the opinion repre-
sented the Court's attempt to circumvent free exercise claims of unwor-
thy petitioners.69 According to Chief Justice Burger, the complaint of
the Amish against compulsory schooling was not philosophical or theo-
cratic. 7° Rather, the Amish way of life was characterized as "one'of
63. The Court stated that "providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of
a State." Id at 213.
64. Id at 214.
65. Id
66. Id at 215.
67. Pepper, supra note 10, at 344. Professor Pfeffer goes even further and states that the free
exercise clause requires more protection than other first amendment rights. "For years with the
exception of one case, the free exercise clause was generally subsumed by its first amendment
brethren. But, in Yoder, the free exercise clause appears to have achieved elevated status and
more than equal significance in the scheme of first amendment protection." Pfeffer, supra note 21,
at 1115; see Marcus, supra note 7, at 1230.
68. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
69. One observer noted,
[T]he case was decided in the wake of the turbulent late sixties, when many a group was
engaged in exploring. . . ways of living fundamentally different. . . from that of the
mainstream. . . .The "countercultural" movement was before the eyes of the Court,
and its opinion appears to want to say "yes" to the Amish while saying "no" to the
hippies.
Pepper, supra note 10, at 335. The year following Yoder, the Supreme Court struck down a con-
gressional amendment to the Food Stamp Act aimed at excluding "hippies." United States Dep't
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
70. The Court compared Amish beliefs with those of Thoreau. "Thus, if the Amish asserted
1982]
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deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and inti-
mately related to daily living."'" The majority implied that the failure
to present these qualities would have changed the decision of the
Court.72
The State of Wisconsin conceded that the Amish beliefs were sin-
cere, but argued that the actions of the Amish, although religiously
based, were outside the protection of the free exercise clause. 73  The
Court agreed that, in certain contexts, 74 the state could reach religious
acts, but that such governmental power was not absolute. Subse-
quently, Wisconsin was unable to carry its case on a belief-action
dichotomy.7
Wisconsin tried to sway the Court by noting that its compulsory
education law was neutral on its face and thus did not discriminate
against any religion. Unconvinced, Chief Justice Burger wrote, "A reg-
ulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend
the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion. 76 Such a conclusion significantly
expanded religious protection, since valid, neutrally applied laws were
not guaranteed to be rubber stamped by the Court in the free exercise
area.
Lastly, Wisconsin advanced two important state interests to justify
the free exercise infringement of the compulsory schooling law. First,
their claims because of their subjective evaluation.. . much as Thoreau [had] rejected the social
values of his time . . . their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was
philosophical and personal . Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
71. Id
72. Chief Justice Burger opined that the Amish had carried a burden that few religious
groups could carry, since the Amish demonstrated the ability to effectively meet the needs ad-
vanced by the state that warranted a religious intrusion. Id at 235-36.
73. In State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567,419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967), the
Kansas Supreme Court upheld Kansas' compulsory education law against an Amish challenge
similar to that in Yoder. The Kansas court subordinated the Amish claim to the legitimate exer-
cise of the state's police power to promote education. The Supreme Court in Yoder specifically
rejected that argument. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
74. These include the exercise of the state's police power to promote health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare, and the federal government's exercise of delegated power. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
75. Justice Douglas, although he dissented on due process grounds involving the fundamen-
tal rights of the children in this case, welcomed the majority's rejection of Reynolds. Id at 247
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
76. Id at 220. This standard is similar to the Cantwell test which protected religious acts
from "undue" burdens. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20. Yet, this standard conflicts
with Yoder's earlier test that only interests of the highest order could outweigh free exercise
claims. In Sherbert, the state had to justify an indirect burden imposed by a neutral law with a
compelling interest. Yoder suggested that such a rigid standard had been lowered. Note, General
Laws, Neutral Princoples, and the Free Exercise Clause, 33 VAND. L. REV. 149, 159 (1980).
[Vol. 18:305
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss2/5
UNITED STATES v. LEE
Wisconsin observed that public education was necessary to prepare an
effective, democratic citizenry. Secondly, it was argued that public ed-
ucation fosters self-reliant, self-sufficient individuals in society. While
agreeing that these interests were important, the Court found that the
Amish way of life was equally effective in meeting these state interests.
The Supreme Court was quite specific in rejecting Wisconsin's ar-
gument for education of Amish children past the eighth grade.
The independence and successful social functioning of the
Amish community for a period approaching almost three cen-
turies and more than 200 years in this country are strong evi-
dence that there is at best a speculative gain, in terms of
meeting the duties of citizenship, from an additional one or
two years of compulsory formal education."
Unlike previous decisions,"8 the Yoder Court used a great deal of cir-
cumspection in balancing the interests presented by both the state and
the Amish.79
Although the Yoder decision was a "close" one, 0 perhaps limited
to the special circumstances presented to the Court, the decision served
to elevate free exercise rights to an unprecedented position. In Yoder,
the Court demanded that the state show precisely its justification for
free exercise burdens. Unlike Reynolds, Prince, and Braunfeld, the
Court did not end its inquiry upon finding the existence of a crucial
state interest in public education. Yoder went beyond that threshold
inquiry to hold that the state's interest was only marginally fulfilled by
requiring Amish participation.
Doubts surrounding the viability of the Yoder decision were re-
solved in 1981 with the decision in Thomas v. Review Board ofthe Indi-
77. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226-27.
78. "Decision[s] in cases such as this . . . involve the kind of close and perhaps repeated
scrutiny of religious practices. . . which the Court has heretofore been anxious to avoid." Id at
240 (White, Brennan & Stewart, JJ., concurring). These Justices also believed that Yoder was a
close case, with a deciding factor being the state's inability to provide convincing reasons why
Amish children should be required to attend formal public schools after the completion of the
eighth grade. Id
79. In reality, the free exercise interest was coupled with the parental claim to raise their
children in any manner they chose. The Court specifically rejected Wisconsin's argument that the
state asparenspatriae could require the education of Amish children despite parental wishes to
the contrary. Wisconsin relied on the precedent of Prince for support. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 22-26 and note 73. The Yoder Court questioned the scope of that case. Citing Sherbert,
the Court noted that regulation of religious conduct by the state was justified by "substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order." Id at 230 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03). Wis-
consin was unable to demonstrate such a threat vis-a-vis compulsory education and, accordingly,
the Amish prevailed.
80. Id at 240 (White, Brennan & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
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ana Employment Security Division.8 In Thomas, the State of Indiana
had denied unemployment benefits to a claimant who had quit his job
for religious reasons. Using Sherbert and Yoder as a guide, the
Supreme Court ruled that the denial of benefits had been unwarranted.
Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness, had been transferred in his previous
factory job to a military related department. Finding his new work to
conflict with his religion and a transfer impossible, Thomas asked to be
discharged. Thomas' request was denied and he subsequently quit.
The Indiana Employment Security Review Board found that reli-
gious reasons had forced Thomas to resign. However, the Board de-
nied Thomas benefits on the grounds that he had not shown good cause
in quitting as required by law. The Indiana Court of Appeals found
the denial of benefits improper and reversed the Review Board.82 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the lower court, ruling
that Thomas had quit for personal reasons and that he had inade-
quately expressed his religious beliefs at the Board hearing. The Indi-
ana Supreme Court found that the burden on Thomas' free exercise
rights was indirect and justified by the state's interest in preventing
fraud. 3
The Supreme Court rebuked the Indiana Supreme Court for ana-
lyzing the validity of Thomas' religious beliefs. According to Chief
Justice Burger, "One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bi-
zarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to pro-
tection. . . but that is not the case here.. .. Courts are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation. 84
The Court then disposed of the indirect burden argument ad-
vanced by the lower court. Chief Justice Burger noted that Sherbert
had clearly rejected a similar contention. Reiterating Yoder, the
81. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). Prior to Thomas, several other free exercise cases came before the
Court. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (affirming that NLRB had
no jurisdiction over unionization of Catholic schools, but failing to reach the religion issues);
Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1973) (denial of veterans' education benefits to a conscien-
tious objector did not constitute a religious burden); Note, supra note 76, at 149. In McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), the Court returned to the belief-action distinction of Rernolds to strike
down a Tennessee law which prohibited priests and ministers from serving as delegates to the
state's constitutional convention. The law was aimed at status (i.e., acts) and not beliefs. How-
ever, the state could not demonstrate a compelling need for the law. For a critical review of the
Court's distinction, see Comment, Constitulional Law--Firsi Amendment-Free E.xercise Clause,
24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rev. 963, 970-74 (1979).
82. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., - Ind. App. -, 381 N.E.2d 888
(1978).
83. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., - Ind. -, 391 N.E.2d 1127 (1979).
84. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16.
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Supreme Court observed that a neutral law, as applied, nevertheless
might unduly infringe upon religious liberties." A substantial burden
existed in Thomas since the Indiana law forced employees to choose
"between fidelity to religious beliefs or cessation of work." 6 In con-
trast to Yoder, the Thomas opinion did not attempt to quantify the reli-
gious burden imposed by the law. The Court more or less assumed that
a burden existed and proceeded to recognize compelling reasons which
might support that burden. In contrast, the Yoder decision made a sub-
stantial inquiry into the extent of the Amish hardship.87
Following the Sherbert precedent, the Thomas Court adhered to a
compelling interest test: "The state may justify an inroad on religious
liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest." 8 Indiana proposed two such compel-
ling interests, to prevent widespread unemployment of those who might
quit for personal reasons and collect benefits and to avoid detailed
probes of an employee's religious convictions by prospective employ-
ers. On both counts, the Supreme Court failed to find evidence sub-
stantiating the state's arguments.89 Therefore, Indiana could not
constitutionally deny benefits to Thomas who had quit for religious
reasons.
90
Although the free exercise clause had narrow beginnings, the mod-
ern Court has expanded the scope of protection in substantial ways.
Originally, religious beliefs were the sole depository of constitutional
protection. According to Reynolds, actions always came under the leg-
islative prerogative of the state, regardless of religious motivation.
Cantwell gave religious acts a reprieve from unduly burdensome state
interference, but such a standard was vague. Prince and Braunfeld il-
lustrated the Court's reluctance to exempt religious adherents from
criminal statutes. Prince held the state's police power to regulate child
labor to be superior to the freedom of religion. Administrative
problems prevented the Court from exempting Orthodox Jews from a
Sunday closing law's indirect religious burden in Braunfeld.
85. Id. at 717 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)).
86. Id
87. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205. One commentator would welcome the change. finding the Yoder
Court's departure to be "one that most effectively subverts the opinion as precedent." Pepper.
supra note 10, at 337.
88. Thomas. 450 U.S. at 718.
89. Id at 719.
90. Id. at 720. Justice Rehnquist disagreed, finding no constitutional mandate requiring the
state to exempt the appellant. For Justice Rehnquist. Braunfeld represented the correct standard
of review in the free exercise area. Id at 722-23, 727 (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting).
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Sherbert marked the turning point in the free exercise area by
holding that only compelling reasons could subordinate religious
rights. Yet, the impact of Sherbert was mitigated by the decision's fail-
ure to adequately distinguish Braunfeld. Yoder acknowledged that a
statute neutral on its face may be scrutinized for religious infringe-
ments. While Yoder expounded a compelling. interest test, the Court in
reality employed a complex balancing approach to decide the case.
Thomas, closely akin to Sherbert, marked the return of a pure compel-
ling interest test.
III. THE CONTROVERSY OF UNITED STATES V LEE
A. Statement of the Case
Edwin Lee, a member of the Old Order Amish, hired several
Amish employees to work in his carpentry shop between 1970 and
1977. During that period of time, Lee failed to withhold and pay quar-
terly social security taxes as required by law.9 The Internal Revenue
Service assessed Lee $27,000 for unpaid taxes. After making one quar-
terly payment, Lee sued the United States for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief.92
In the district court, Lee maintained that payment of social secur-
ity taxes violated his free exercise of religion. The Amish interpret
scripture to prohibit their participation in the nation's welfare system. 93
In accordance with this belief, Congress exempted self-employed
Amish members from the payment of social security taxes in section
1402(g) of the Internal Revenue Code.94
After finding a significant free exercise burden on the Amish
91. 26 U.S.C. § 3111 (1976), part of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), re-
quires an employer to contribute to the fund through an excise tax. The Federal Unemployment
Tax Act (FUTA), id. § 3301, requires a similar contribution through an excise tax, to be made by
employers. d. § 3101 obligates an employer to deduct a certain amount of money from his em-
ployees as required by the FICA.
92. Lee v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
93. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1054 n.3, states, "Appellee indicates that his scriptural basis for this
belief was: 'But if any provide not ... for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is
worse than an infidel.' (I Timothy 5:8)."
94. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1976) provides:
(I) Exemption-Any individual may file an application (in such form and man-
ner, and with such official, as may be prescribed by regulations under this chapter) for an
exemption from the tax imposed by this chapter if he is a member of a recognized reli-
gious sect or division thereof and is an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such
sect or division by reason of which he is conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the
benefits of any private or public insurance which makes payments in the event of death,
disability, old-age, or retirement or makes payments toward the cost of, or provides serv-
ices for, medical care (including the benefits of any insurance system established by the
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through forced contributions to the social security system, the district
court expanded the application of section 1402(g) to exempt Amish em-
ployers and similarly situated employers. Although injunctive relief
was denied, the lower court found that section 1402(g) was unconstitu-
tional as applied to the facts of Lee's case. The United States appealed,
and the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the district court's
ruling.95
B. Rationale of the Supreme Court
In refusing to accommodate the Amish beliefs regarding the na-
tional welfare system, the Supreme Court initially stated that section
1402(g) did not expressly exempt Amish employers from paying social
security taxes. Finding no statutory grounds for a religious exception,
the Court had to inquire whether the free exercise clause saved the
Amish from paying social security taxes. The Court's first task was to
determine whether the law imposed an unconstitutional burden on the
free exercise clause.
In summary fashion, the Supreme Court found that burden: "Be-
Social Security Act). Such exemptions may be granted only if the application contains
or is accompanied by-
(A) such evidence of such individual's membership in, and adherence to the tenets
or teachings of, the sect or division thereof as the Secretary may require for pur-
poses of determining such individual's compliance with the preceding sentence, and
(B) his waiver of all benefits and other payments under titles II and XVIII of the
Social Security Act on the basis of his wages and self-employment income as well as
all such benefits and other payments to him on the basis of the wages and self-
employment income of any other person,
and only if the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare finds that-
(C) such sect or division thereof has the established tenets or teachings referred to
in the preceding sentence,
(D) it is the practice, and has been for a period of time which he deems to be
substantial, for members of such sect or division thereof to make provision for their
dependent members which in his judgment is reasonable in view of their general
level of living, and
(E) such sect or division thereof has been in existence at all times since December
31, 1950.
Of the several cases to be litigated concerning the exemption, all have been decided against the
religious objectors, either because the objectors were not members of an "established sect" or
because they did not provide for their dependents. See Varga v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1113
(D.C. Md. 1979); Henson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 835 (1976); Palmer v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.
310 (1969).
95. The Supreme Court was obligated by statute to review the Lee case since the lower court
had declared an act of Congress unconstitutional. See 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) (allowing any
party to appeal to the Supreme Court a judgment holding a congressional act unconstitutional in
any action where the United States is a party). In a succinct opinion, Chief Justice Burger con-
cluded that the Amish were not entitled to relief. Unlike previous religion cases, there was no
dissension among the Justices. This could indicate that the entire Court considers the area of
neutral tax laws to be beyond the reach of the free exercise clause.
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cause the payment of the taxes or receipt of benefits violates Amish
religious beliefs, compulsory participation in the social security system
interferes with their Free Exercise rights."96 Citing Prince and Reyn-
olds, the Court next observed that the existence of a burden was not the
deciding factor, but rather that a state could justify an encroachment of
the free exercise clause by showing that such interference was "essential
to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."97 The Supreme
Court then inquired whether mandatory contribution to the welfare
system by employers qualified as such an interest.
In lucid and concise language, the Lee Court concluded that
"[b]ecause the social security system is nationwide, the governmental
interest is apparent."98 This conclusion primarily rested on the size and
nature of the social security system. According to recent calculations,
the system provided monthly comprehensive insurance and benefits of
approximately eleven billion dollars to thirty-six million Americans.99
The design of the system thus required mandatory contributions from
all employers. Further, the Court noted that the "fiscal soundness" of
the welfare system had been the subject of "congressional concern." 100
In summary, the Supreme Court stated that "a comprehensive na-
tional social security system providing for voluntary participation
would be almost a contradiction in terms and difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to administer. Thus, the government's interest in assuring
mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the so-
cial security system is very high."''
The final analysis of the Court focused on the impact that an
Amish exemption would have on the government's ability to provide a
viable welfare system. The Lee Court acknowledged that accommoda-
tion of religious beliefs with tax laws presented the judiciary with a
delicate task, complicated by the fact that "we are a cosmopolitan na-
tion made up of people of almost every conceivable religious prefer-
96. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1055. The Court adhered to the Thomas approach which required
finding a threshold burden in order to trigger further review. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717.
97. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1055.
98. Id
99. Id n.8 (citing NAT'L COMM'N ON SOCIAL SEC., SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE
5 (1981)).
100. Id at 1056 n.9. The exact purpose of this footnote is unclear. The Court may be imply-
ing that since the system is financially troubled, Amish contributions are even more pressing. Yet,
there is evidence to indicate that an Amish exemption would have a very negligible impact on the
system. See infra text accompanying notes 137, 144-45.
101. 1d at 1056.
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ence."' 0 2 The Court viewed accommodation to be possible, but not
required and was therefore unwilling to radically restrict the scope of
the legislature." 3 Accordingly, certain religious practices had to be
subordinated to the common welfare. i0 4
Central to its decision in Lee, the Court stated, "Unlike the situa-
tion presented in Wisconsin v. Yoder, it would be difficult to accommo-
date the comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions
flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs."' °5 The Court then
buttressed this conclusion with the analogy that the payment of social
security taxes was not "fundamentally different from the obligation to
pay income taxes."' 0 6 Thus, if the Court exempted the Amish, then
religious adherents, believing war to be sin, could claim a similar ex-
emption from paying taxes which are spent in a manner that violates
their religion.'0 7 The Court concluded that the tax system in general
could not survive such exemptions. Accordingly, the Court found that
"religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis
for resisting the tax."0 8
In the concluding portion of the opinion, the Court refused to ex-
pand the narrow and "readily identifiable" category of religious ex-
emptions Congress had chosen to establish.'09 Although the Court
found no constitutional mandate of an Amish exemption in this case, it
offered a possible partial solution.
We note that here the statute compels contributions to
102. Id (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
103. Id
104. Id. The Court generalized, "To maintain an organized society that guarantees religious
freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common
good." Id Prior to Lee, the Court held repeatedly that religious freedom should come before the
common good. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (no
liberty is more essential to a free society than freedom of religion); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (freedom of speech, press, and religion are in a preferred position); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (no estate in society is higher
than the right to freely practice one's religious beliefs); United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (plurality opinion) (strict scrutiny perhaps applicable to combat
prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities").
105. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1056 (citation omitted).
106. Id
107. Id Justice Stevens found the Amish claim to be "readily distinguishable" from the war
tax resister claims since "in the typical case the tax payer is not in any position to supply the
government with an equivalent substitute for the objectional use of his money." Id at 1058 n.l
(Stevens, J., concurring). The analogy is further flawed since the Amish refuse to participate in
the welfare system generally and do not disagree as to how the social security tax payments are
spent.
108. Id at 1056.
109. Id at 1057.
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the system by way of taxes; it does not compel anyone to ac-
cept benefits. Indeed, it would be possible for an Amish
member, upon qualifying for social security benefits, to re-
ceive and pass them along to an Amish fund having parallel
objectives. It is not for us to speculate whether this would
ease or mitigate the perceived sin of participation." ,0
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, advocated a different
standard of review. Stevens argued that the Amish had the burden to
justify why they deserved an exemption from a valid tax law. Until the
Amish met that burden, it was not the government's task to provide a
compelling justification for denying an exemption. Justice Stevens also
believed that the Court had overstated the potential for a myriad of
other religious exemption claims and the difficulty of their process-
ing."' The establishment clause, and not administrative convenience,
compelled Justice Stevens to reject the free exercise claim of the
Amish." 2
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEE
A. Narrowing the Free Exercise Standard
The decision in United States v. Lee significantly narrows free ex-
ercise protection in several ways. First, the standard of review used by
the Lee Court signals a shift from the compelling interest test set out in
Sherbert and affirmed in Yoder and Thomas. According to Lee, as
long as a law is essential to accomplishing an overriding governmental
interest, free exercise rights may be subject to infringement.' 3
The difference between "compelling" and "overriding" interests
may seem slight, but Lee's significance stems from the Court's failure
to further qualify what interests are included by the term "overriding."
For example, in Sherbert the Court qualified compelling interests as
"only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests."" 4 Simi-
larly, in Yoder the Court stated that "only those interests of the highest
110. Id n.12.
I 11. Id at 1057-58 (Stevens, J., concurring).
112. "In my opinion, the principal reason for adopting a strong presumption against such
claims is not a matter of administrative convenience. It is the overriding interest in keeping the
government ... out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims."
Id at 1058 n.2. Stevens later reiterated this position in Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 1690
n.4 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. 102 S. Ct. at 1055.
114. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
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order and those not otherwise served" t 5 could override the individ-
ual's freedom of religion. In 1981, the Supreme Court reiterated that
qualification in Thomas.16
Since Sherbert, the Supreme Court has required the state to prove
interests of the highest order before the Court will sustain a law cur-
tailing the exercise of religious beliefs. The Lee standard of review,
however, is less demanding. As noted above, the Court described the
government's interest in mandatory tax payments as "apparent,"" 7 but
noticeably absent from the Lee opinion was the highest order language
of Yoder. Only a retreat from the strict Yoder-Thomas position al-
lowed the Court to sustain the application of the tax law in question.
Thus, Lee seems to stand for the proposition that tax laws' 18 are to
be accorded more deference than other areas conflicting with the free
exercise of religion. In essence, the presence of the tax issue may dis-
tinguish Lee from previous and future free exercise cases. Historically,
the Supreme Court has given Congress wide latitude in the area of
taxation.
The provisions of such [a revenue] act should not be lightly or
unadvisedly set aside. . . . The power to tax is the one great
power upon which the whole national fabric is based. It is as
necessary to the existence and prosperity of a nation as is the
air he breathes to the natural man.' '9
More recently, the courts have faced a barrage of claims from reli-
gious adherents seeking war tax exemptions.' 20 In every case but
one,' 2 ' the courts uniformly have rejected an exemption, typically con-
115. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
116. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
117. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1055; see supra text accompanying note 98.
118. Id It is unclear in Lee whether the governmental interest in a state or local tax would be
as apparent when compared to a social security tax. Religious claims are more likely to prevail on
the state or local level since the Court might find such taxes to be less crucial to maintaining an
organized society. At a minimum, the state or local government would have to argue that its tax is
no different in relative coverage and importance than a national social security tax.
119. Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1899). Compare the language of Nicol, quoted in the
text, with Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1056 ("The tax system could not function if denominations were
allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates
their religious belief.") (citations omitted).
120. See Lull v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014
(1980) (plaintiff denied deductions of a percentage of tax dollars used to finance defense expendi-
tures contrary to his religious objections to war); Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir.
1969) (petitioners denied refunds claimed for religious objection to financing war activities); Rus-
sell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 942 (1973) (taxpayer cannot avoid tax payments on religious
grounds); Muste v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 913 (1961) (religious opposition to war does not justify
refusal to pay income tax).
121. American Friends Serv. Comm. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd
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cluding that nothing in the Constitution prohibits Congress from taxing
all people.122
Since the war tax refusal cases were decided under a variety of
constitutional standards, Lee can be read as clarifying the Court's posi-
tion on the issue. However, in view of the Lee decision, even with the
use of a compelling interest standard, it appears that tax exemptions for
religious reasons will not be constitutionally carved out by the high
Court.
B. Neutral Laws and Free Exercise in Light of Lee
While the Court in Lee specifically rejected an exemption to the
payment of social security taxes, the holding might be extended to ap-
ply to neutral laws in general. Support for this proposition is given in
dicta in Lee: "When followers of a particular sect enter into commer-
cial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own
conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed
on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that
activity. '
In short, the Lee decision implies that a religious adherent may
choose to either forego entering commercial activity and remain loyal
to his religion or enter commercial activity at the expense of his beliefs.
Lee, as an Amish employer, was penalized, in effect, for entering into
the commercial world, whereas self-employed members of his faith are
not presented with such a dilemma. Prior to Lee, the Supreme Court
had repeatedly found such penalties to be unconstitutional in view of
the free exercise clause.
In Sherbert the appellant faced a similar dilemma; she could either
give up her religion and work on Saturdays to qualify for unemploy-
inpar/per curiam, 419 U.S. 7 (1974) (employer withholding percentage of war related tax from
Quaker employees violated their freedom of religion to bear witness against the use of the tax).
122. Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1969). In summary, the court in Au/en.
rieth stated, "[l]f every citizen could refuse to pay all or part of his taxes because he disapproved
of the government's use of the money, on religious grounds, the ability of the government to
function could be impaired or even destroyed." Id at 588-89 (citations omitted). The Lee Court
used almost identical language concerning the demise of the nation's tax system if the Amish were
granted an exemption. See Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1056.
123. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1057. Several cases decided after Lee have not limited the use of this
"commercial activity" language to free exercise claims and tax laws. See Tressler Lutheran Home
for Children v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302, 306-07 (3d Cir. 1982) (preventing unionization of Lutheran
Home would violate non-Lutheran workers' right to unionize); Jacobo Marti & Sons v. NLRB,
676 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1982) (unionization of a plant would not infringe on Amish free exercise
rights, while denying unionization would infringe on the rights of non-Amish employees).
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ment benefits or remain loyal to her beliefs, refuse to work on Satur-
days, and thus forfeit her compensation. The Supreme Court here, in
contrast to Lee, found that such a choice constituted an unwarranted
burden on the appellant's freedom of religion.
The Court's position in Sherbert was reaffirmed in Thomas where
a state could not condition the receipt of benefits upon conduct prohib-
ited by religious beliefs. Such a choice forced the adherent to "modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs . . . . While the compulsion
may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless sub-
stantial." '24 In a similar manner, Lee may be said to be required to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs in order that the nation's
welfare system may survive.
In both Sherbert and Thomas, the appellants entered a sphere of
commercial activity as factory workers. Significantly, in both decisions,
the appellant's religious beliefs were superimposed on the statutory
scheme binding others in that activity. For example, although Sherbert
had refused to work on Saturdays, a self-imposed limitation based on
her religious faith, the Supreme Court required the state to pay her
unemployment benefits. Arguably, had Sherbert refused to work on
Saturdays for reasons unrelated to her religion, she would have been
denied benefits as would any other person. 125 Hence, Sherbert's reli-
gious limitations were effectively superimposed by the Court on South
Carolina's neutrally applied disqualification statute. 126
While the choice forced on Lee is comparable to the choices
presented to petitioners Sherbert and Thomas, the Supreme Court
made no attempt to distinguish the cases, even though the Court came
to opposite conclusions. As a result, the standard of review regarding
religious claims and neutral laws is now uncertain.' 27  Until Lee, the
predictability of the Court in this area of free exercise was clear: neu-
124. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18; see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (disqual-
ification of priests and ministers from state politics constituted a fine on religious actions).
125. While the Court never reached this issue, Professor Pfeffer suggested as much. "[lit is a
reasonable conjecture that if Mrs. Sherbert had refused a proffered position on a newspaper be-
cause she disagreed with its editorial policy she would not have prevailed in the case. . . . But
...the Court. . .maintained a silence of neutrality regarding what it did not have to decide."
Pfeffer, supra note 21, at 1140.
126. The same argument can be made for Thomas since the facts of the two cases are nearly
identical.
127. Justice Stevens attempted to distinguish the cases in his concurring opinion. He noted
that in Sherbert and Thomas, the Court had protected each appellant from unfair treatment, while
in Lee, the religious adherent was seeking favorable treatment. For that reason the standard of
review was lower in Lee. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1058 n.3. Stevens argued that if tax exemptions were
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tral laws imposing an undue burden on religious practices would not
withstand inspection by the Court. Lee suggests a completely opposite
conclusion, at the expense of valid free exercise claims.' 28
The Court may have rejected an Amish employer exemption in
order to avoid possible establishment clause problems. 29 For example,
if the Court had exempted Amish employers, it is plausible that the
exemption would be viewed as an incentive or subsidy to join a certain
religious group. Further, employers would have a motive to hire only
employees of a certain faith in order to maintain the employer's tax
exempt status. The Supreme Court would be unlikely to sanction such
discrimination.
A religious employer exemption would force the courts to inquire
into the sincerity of an employer's belief to ensure his qualification for
such an exemption. Such an inquiry would raise serious entanglement
issues.1 30 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court expressly left the establish-
ment clause issue open by stating, "We need not decide whether. . . if
Congress had, as the District Court believe [sic], intended 1402(g) to
reach this case, conflicts with the Establishment Clause would arise."131
While the issue was never reached by the Court, it is probable that
these problems remained in the background.
allowed on religious grounds, "every citizen would have an economic motivation to join the fa-
vored sects." Id
Three criticisms can be raised regarding Justice Stevens' argument. First, it is speculative
whether every citizen would rush for the nearest church if the Court were to accommodate the
Amish. Further, it seems unlikely that the Amish, who seek to isolate themselves from the materi-
alistic world, would also seek an economic advantage in a tax exemption from the Court. Thus,
Stevens, with other members of the Court, appears to overstate the magnitude of this risk.
Secondly, in Thomas, the Court deemed itself capable of distinguishing valid claims from
claims so "bizarre" and "nonreligious" in nature as "not to be entitled to protection." Thomas,
450 U.S. at 715; accord Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1055 n.6.
Third, it is arguable whether Amish employers seek only protection against the unequal treat-
ment Congress has afforded self-employed Amish members under § 1402(g).
128. One writer summarized the impact, "At a time when we have grown increasingly protec-
tive of individual rights in general, and of first amendment rights in particular, the neutrality
principle affords religious free exercise claims only the most minimal sort of scrutiny long ago
relegated to the non-first amendment area of economic regulation." Merel, The Protection oflndi-
vidual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Reigion Under the FirstAmendment, 45 U. CHI. L.
REv. 805, 808 (1978).
129. U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion . ... "
130. "[A] legislative enactment does not contravene the Establishment Clause if it has a secu-
lar legislative purpose, if its principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and
if it does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980) (citations omitted).
131. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1057 n.ll.
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C. Administrative Convenience
Implicitly, Lee holds that the possibility of administrative conven-
ience is sufficient to outweigh legitimate free exercise claims. The
Court there stated that the welfare system would have difficulty in ac-
commodating the myriad of exceptions flowing from the diversity of
religious beliefs held in this country.
32
The Court relied on a similar argument in refusing to exempt
Braunfeld from Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law.'33 That conclusion
was highly criticized by Justice Brennan, in dissent, who found the ad-
ministrative convenience argument to be more "fanciful than real.' ' 34
In an indictment equally applicable to the Lee decision, Brennan
wrote,
In fine, the Court, in my view, has exalted administrative con-
venience to a constitutional level high enough to justify mak-
ing one religion economically disadvantageous . . . . The
Court forgets, I think, a warning uttered during the congres-
sional discussion of the First Amendment itself: ". . .the
rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy,
and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental
hand. .. 135
In a similar fashion, Lee signals the return of administrative conven-
ience to an elevated status. Lee thus substantially undercuts the more
recent holding in Thomas. In Thomas, Indiana urged the Supreme
Court to accept the prevention of widespread unemployment and the
disruption of work schedules as compelling reasons to justify the dis-
qualification of Thomas. Rejecting that contention, the Court wrote,
"There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the number of peo-
ple who find themselves in the predicament of choosing between bene-
fits and religious beliefs is large enough to create 'widespread
unemployment,' or even to seriously affect unemployment."' 136
132. A similar argument was successfully made in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971). The Court refused to grant exemptions from military duty to those who opposed particu-
lar wars and not war in general. Fearful that the exemption would raise administrative problems
and entangle the government in difficult classifications of what is religious or political, the Court
rejected Gillette's free exercise claim. See also Galanter, supra note 44, at 296 (the Court should
hesitate to grant exemptions when the "bearableness of the exemption turns on numbers").
133. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
134. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 615 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Id at 615-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719. Sherbert rejected the possibility of fraudulent claims and the
disruption of work schedules as interests capable of outweighing free exercise claims. See supra
text accompanying notes 50-51.
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Contradictory to Thomas, the Supreme Court in Lee implied that
an extensive number of people were in the position of having to choose
between paying social security taxes or violating their religious be-
liefs. 137 Yet, the Court cited no statistical evidence or evidence in the
record to substantiate such a claim. Justice Stevens was perhaps cor-
rect in saying that the Court had overstated the magnitude of the
problem.138
The district court specifically rejected the unlimited exemptions
argument in its decision. The district court stated,
The group seeking exemption is clearly defined, long-recog-
nized, and unquestionably sincere. Nor is there a danger of
an open-ended category capable of uncontrolled expansion.
The Old Order Amish, and groups like them, are small groups
whose labor generates a small amount of wages and
taxes. . . . Clearly the granting of the exemption does not
interfere with the establishment or preservation of the general
welfare of the public. 139
Chief Justice Burger countered that argument by stating that self-em-
ployed workers in Amish-like communities were discernible from the
"generality of wage earners employed by others."',4 Yet, it is unclear
why people who work for employers in a "religious community having
its own 'welfare' system,"' 4 1 are any less distinguishable than similarly
situated self-employed persons.
Nevertheless, it was well within the power of the Supreme Court to
exempt Amish employers without creating a myriad of exceptions. The
Lee opinion suggested this conclusion when it noted that the Amish
have their own welfare system. In Yoder, the Court noted that the
Amish were a self-sufficient society rejecting all forms of welfare. 142 It
was especially crucial in Yoder that the Amish demonstrated an alter-
137. "'[W]idespread individual voluntary coverage under social security . would under-
mine the soundness of the social security program.'" Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1055-56 (quoting S. REP.
No. 404, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. Pt. III, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1943,
2056).
138. One authority notes that the judiciary is ill-equipped to determine such figures. "In an-
swering such questions [concerning the government's interest], however, the numbers of believers
of a particular sort should not generally determine the outcome. Such estimates by cgurts can
seldom be reliable in the absence of statistical evidence." Clark, supra note 7, at 360. The Lee
Court failed to heed such a warning and concluded that large numbers of religious objectors in
this case warranted the rejection of the Amish claims. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1056.
139. Lee v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 180, 182-83 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
140. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1057.
141. Id
142. The Yoder Court made specific mention of the § 1402(g) tax exemption afforded to
Amish adherents because of their self-sufficiency. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222-23 n.l 1.
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native education system that was comparable to the state's system.
Such a showing effectively constrained the possibility of a myriad of
exceptions flowing from the accommodation of religion and public
education.
The Lee Court, using similar reasoning, could have exempted
Amish employers from paying social security taxes upon demonstrating
a legitimate religious burden imposed by the law and a substitute for
the provision of social security benefits. An exemption under this stan-
dard would fulfill two objectives. First, the governmental interest in
providing for dependents after a certain age would be met. Second,
such employers would not have to choose between paying taxes or vio-
lating their religious beliefs. 43
The Supreme Court, however, rejected such a position on the
ground that an accommodation of religious claims in these circum-
stances would make the social security system almost impossible to ad-
minister. Yet this conclusion is valid only if participation in the social
security system is individual and voluntary. In short, the Court spoke
to issues that were not at hand. The Supreme Court in Lee never
reached the question of whether the grant of an Amish exemption
would circumvent the "fiscal vitality of the social security system."' 44
While it is clear that widespread voluntary participation would under-
mine the system, it is unsettled whether an Amish employer exemption
would have the same impact.
As noted above, the district court calculated that the amount of
wages and taxes produced by the Amish was small and the correspond-
ing loss of revenue from an exemption was "negligible."t 41 Justice Ste-
143, Speaking of the legislative exemption for the Amish under § 1402(g), Professor Gianella
wrote,
IT]he legislative exemption requires the Amish to make adequate provision for the sup-
port of the elderly in their communities. This substantially reduces the danger of confer-
ring a preferential economic benefit in violation of the establishment clause or the
principle of distributive justice. . . . [Tihe social security system is a government-oper-
ated insurance program-a special kind of governmental undertaking. Because of its
special function the concept of withdrawal without disruption is at least plausible.
Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part L The Religious
Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1410 (1967). The fact that socialized insurance is
based on participation by all mitigated Gianella's argument supporting such an exemption. Id
Justice Stevens' opinion in Lee indicates that Gianella's characterization of the social security tax
having a special function is a correct appraisal. See Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1058 n.l.
144. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1055.
145. Lee v. United States, 497 F. Supp. at 183. The actual figures of this controversy tend to
support such a conclusion. According to the Supreme Court, the social security system distributes
over $11 billion annually. In comparison, the first quarterly payment due from Lee equalled $91
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vens' concurring opinion was much more explicit than the district
court's evaluation.
As a matter of administration, it would be a relatively simple
matter to extend the exemption to the taxes involved in this
case. As a matter of fiscal policy, an enlarged exemption
probably would beneft the social security system because the
nonpayment of these taxes by the Amish would be more than
offset by the elimination of their right to collect benefits. 46
Justice Stevens' argument suggests that the governmental interest in
mandatory Amish participation is less than overriding, as required by
the Court to justify a free exercise burden.
Regardless of the negligible loss of revenue accruing from an
Amish exemption, the possibility of greater administrative convenience
effectively subverted Lee's free exercise claim. Stronger administrative
arguments had been rejected by the Supreme Court in Sherbert and
Thomas as well as in the less important area of gender discrimination
and equal protection.'47 Yet the Lee decision altogether ignores these
holdings. As a result, the precedent of Lee will likely encourage states
to present the possibility of administrative inconvenience as justifica-
tion for a free exercise infringement. Such a claim is far from the com-
pelling variety previously required by Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas.
D. The Cutting Back of Yoder
The sheltering of religious claims under the free exercise clause
was reduced by the Lee ruling in a fourth and final way. Lee illus-
trated a reluctance on the Court's part to employ a "thoroughgoing" 48
and his total assessment for seven years amounted to $27,000, an infinitesimally small amount in
comparison to a single year's worth of social security distributions. See Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1055.
146. Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1057 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Yet, Steven's argu-
ment is mitigated by the fact that the self-employed Amish are required by law not to accept social
security benefits. Further, the Amish in general do not accept such benefits on religious grounds.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
147. In the area of equal protection and gender-based discrimination, the Court requires a
showing that gender-based laws are substantially related to achieving an important governmental
interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In several cases, the government has
attempted to satisfy the Craig test by showing that gender-based discrimination is necessary to
foster administrative convenience. The Court has consistently rejected such an argument. See
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980) (mere assertion of administra-
tive convenience will not sustain gender-based discriminatory law); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281
& n.12 (1979) (administrative convenience cannot justify law requiring husbands, but not wives, to
pay alimony upon divorce); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (" 'administrative
convenience' is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality"). Yet, the
mere recitation of such a word in Lee appears to have been decisive.
148. See Gianella, supra note 143, at 1390.
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balancing approach in resolving free exercise disputes. Such an ap-
proach was used to some extent in the Yoder decision, in that the bal-
ancing standard there ensured that religious claims would receive close
judicial attention. Lee moved away from such a position and, as a re-
sult, free exercise cases in the future are less likely to be decided in
favor of religion.
The balancing approach in Yoder was narrow since the Court took
great care to weigh the religious issues against the secular interests.
The Court, noting the magnitude of its task, wrote that "we must
searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its
requirement for compulsory education at age 16. .. .
On the Amish side of the balance in Yoder, the Court reviewed the
specific impact on the Amish religion if an exemption to public school
attendance were not given. According to the Yoder opinion, the refusal
of an Amish exception meant the ultimate destruction of the Amish
way of life. On the state's side of the balance, the Court focused on the
impact that an additional two years of schooling would have on the
important interest of preparing an effective citizenry. The Court con-
cluded that compulsory education of Amish children would marginally
meet the state's interest. In fact, the Amish system of education was
thought to be superior to Wisconsin's method. The Court was thus
pragmatic in weighing the important issues presented by both sides in
Yoder. In contrast, the approach of the Lee Court was unrealistic.
The balancing approach of the Court in Lee was too broad to give
proper/deference to the religious issue at hand. As one commentator
noted, "A balancing test is imprecise and provides a court with great
latitude for manipulaton [sic], even when the scale is skewed by the
requirement of a 'compelling interest.' The level of generality at which
the interests are defined often determines the outcome."' 5 ° The Lee
ruling illustrates such a flaw.
In Lee, the Supreme Court failed to examine the impact that the
149. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
150. Pepper, supra note 10, at 341. One commentator stated that "[t]he highly intuitive evalu-
ation of this governmental cost by a court, based on information which may be sparse or at least
difficult to accumulate, contributes a great deal of the uncertainty... . in all ad hoc balancing
tests." Clark, supra note 7, at 332; see also Marcus, supra note 7, at 1240, 1246 (ad hoc approach
does not apply any "rules" and thus standard is unclear); Gianella, supra note 143, at 1384 (bal-
ancing test substitutes subjective standards for objective standards); Note, Religious Exemptions
Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 355-62
(1980) (current approach suffers from conceptual and practical defects); f Note, Legislative Pur-
pose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 137-38 (1972) (Court may also manipu-
late level of abstraction to justify its results in equal protection cases).
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refusal of a religiously based tax exemption would have on the practice
of the Amish faith. Arguably, forcing the Amish to participate in the
social security system would have the same impact that compulsory
formal public education would have had, the substantial subversion of
the Amish faith. In each case, the law in question affects basic tenets of
the Amish religion. While that issue had been decisive in Yoder, the
Lee decision ignores it completely. Unlike the Yoder decision, the Lee
decision is much more ambiguous in defining the religious issues
presented by the Amish.' 5 1
In particular, Lee described the affected religious interests with
such broad phrases as "some religious practices [must] yield to the
common good." '52 In other places the Court observed that "every per-
son cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every
aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs."' 53 The Court used a
high level of generality, with no mention of Amish religious practices
or the extent of the Amish burden.
The Court was more specific in Lee in representing the nature of
the government's interests. Throughout the Lee opinion, the Court
speaks of the demise of the tax system should a religious exemption be
granted.'14 In the end, the Court had to balance the subordination of
"some religious practices" against the maintenance of the "common
good" of an "organized society" and the nation's tax system.'5 5 Given
such interests, the outcome appeared weighted in favor of the common
good and the tax system.
Greater sensitivity to the demands of religious freedom could have
been achieved with the use of a more "realistic"' 56 balancing approach.
After determining that the Amish were significantly burdened by the
151. Justice Stevens found the Court's attempt to distinguish Yoder ineffective "because pre-
cisely the same religious interest is implicated in both cases and Wisconsin's interest in requiring
its children to attend school until they reach the age of 16 is surely not inferior to the federal
interest in collecting these social security taxes." Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1058 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
152. Id at 1056.
153. Id at 1057.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
155. See Lee, 102 S. Ct. at 1056. Particularly disturbing is the fact that an Amish exemption,
for all practical purposes, will not signal the end of an organized society, nor will it cause the
catastrophic collapse of the nation's tax system. The Supreme Court failed to provide the causal
links between the alleged fear and the alleged cause.
156. The Yoder Court stated, "By preserving [the] doctrinal flexibility and recognizing the
need for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion Clauses 'we have been able to chart a
(narrow) course. . .[between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause].'" Yoder,
406 U.S. at 221 (quoting walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970)).
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payment of social security taxes and that the governmental interests in
maintaining that system were overriding, the Court should then have
focused on the specific costs and benefits present on each side.157
The cost of failing to forge an Amish exemption to the law, as in
Yoder, may mean the destruction of the Amish religious practice. The
benefit of an Amish exemption is apparent: the Amish may enter into
commercial activity without violating a basic tenet of their religion.
The true cost to the government in granting a tax exemption is, argua-
bly, negligible.' 58
This balancing approach tips in favor of the Amish when the true
costs of the exemption are considered. In general, this approach is
more realistic, sensitive, and true to the facts than the Lee process.
Consequently, free exercise claims are better protected since the degree
of manipulation available to the Court is reduced. The Court must
weigh specific claims under this method and is unable to phrase the
standard of review in abstract language.
One commentator, advocating the use of such a balancing ap-
proach, remarked,
Those cases pitting a sincere religious belief against a compel-
ling state interest, the 'close' cases, do not lend themselves to
the relatively unyielding contours of definitional balancing.
Considerations such as whether the individual's practice of
his religion would be effectively destroyed and whether the
state's interest occupies a priority in its hierarchy of values,
among others, would be appropriate in such an added
balance.
While the necessity for such an added step cannot be
shown from either Sherbert or Yoder-because in each case
no compelling state interest was found-the problem is cer-
tainly by no means purely academic.' 59
In a similar fashion, the decision against the Amish in Lee was not as
academic as the Court's opinion suggests. Lee was a close case, pitting
the religious beliefs of the Amish against the overriding interest of
mandatory tax payments. Unfortunately, the Court's broad balancing
approach predetermined the fate of the Amish. Future free exercise of
religion cases will suffer the same results unless the Supreme Court
shifts to a more precise balancing approach.
157. See Marcus, supra note 7, at 1245.
158. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
159. Marcus, supra note 7, at 1246.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lee portends a
shift away from a realistic and protective application of the free exer-
cise clause. Since 1963, with the Sherbert decision, the Court has con-
sistently required the state to show a compelling interest of the highest
order to justify subordinating freedom of religion. Lee lowered that
standard by requiring that an overriding interest be shown.
It remains to be seen what the term "overriding" will encompass.
Certainly, compulsory social security payments by religious groups will
constitute an overriding interest. In view of Lee, it is unlikely that reli-
gious objections will be accommodated in favor of neutrally applied
tax laws. In fact, the language of Lee suggests that neutral laws in gen-
eral may be beyond the reach of the free exercise clause, at least when
"commercial activity" is present.
.The possibility of administrative inconvenience as an overriding
interest further substantiates the narrowing of religious liberties. Bur-
dens imposed on the freedom of religion by the operation of a law de-
serve a much higher level of justification than the mere possibility of
administrative inconvenience.
Currently, the Supreme Court's balancing approach is ill-equipped
to decide borderline free exercise cases. The present process is unreal-
istic and fails to support the Court's ultimate decision in Lee.160 The
more realistic approach presented in this Note would provide the
Supreme Court with a better method to decide free exercise cases in the
future.
The Supreme Court in Lee has strayed off the rather narrow path
it has constructed in the free exercise area over the last several decades.
Justice Brennan, twenty years ago, stated the proper direction the
Supreme Court should travel in the free exercise area: "For the values
of the First Amendment, as embodied in the Fourteenth, look primar-
ily towards the preservation of personal liberty, rather than towards the
fulfillment of collective goals."'16' It is hoped that the decision of
160. Justice Stevens reiterated the point.
In view of the fact that the Amish have demonstrated their capacity to care for their own,
the social cost of eliminating this relatively small group of dedicated believers would be
minimal. Thus, if we confine the analysis to the Government's interest in rejecting the
particular claim to an exemption at stake in this case, the constitutional standard as
formulated by the Court has not been met.
Lee, 102 S. CL at 1057 (Stevens, J., concurring).
161. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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